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We investigate whether politician gender influences policy outcomes in India. We focus upon 
antenatal and postnatal public health provision since the costs of poor services in this domain 
are disproportionately borne by women. Accounting for potential endogeneity of politician 
gender and the sample composition of births, we find that a one standard deviation increase 
in women’s political representation results in a 1.5 percentage point reduction in neonatal 
mortality. Women politicians are more likely to build public health facilities and encourage 
antenatal care, institutional delivery and immunization. The results are topical given that a bill 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates whether women elected to state legislative assemblies are more 
effective than their male counterparts in providing public health services in India. It binds two 
streams of the literature, one concerned with political identity and the other with differences in 
preferences  between  the  sexes.  In  the  benchmark  model  of  democracy,  policy  choices  are 
independent of legislator identity (Downs 1957) but not in more recent citizen candidate models 
(Besley and Coate 1997, Levitt 1996, Osborne and Slivinski 1996). Overlaid on the hypothesis 
that the gender of politicians influences policy and thereby social outcomes is the hypothesis that 
women have different preferences and so make different choices from men. Establishing the 
empirical relevance of these differences is key to informing debates over quotas for women in 
government,  debates  which  refer to representation  as much  as to  principles of  fairness and 
diversity (Squires 1996), but which suffer from a scarcity of causal evidence of the impact of 
representation on policy outcomes. 
Preference differences between the sexes identified in numerous settings suggest that 
women are more likely than men to (i) invest in children and (ii) favour redistribution.
1 These 
findings  suggest  that  women  may  be  more  likely  to  deliver  public  health  improvements  in 
developing countries where there are sharp positive age and income gradients in health and the 
essential policy challenge lies in addressing the early life health and survival of children in poor 
families.
2  Moreover,  the  benefits  of  interventions  in  this  area  flow  differentially  to  women 
because they disproportionately bear the costs of weak reproductive and child health services. 
Women carry the burden of high fertility and child mortality: they care for the sick, witness their 
children die, have further births, and risk dying in child birth.
3 In line with our hypothesis, the 
enfranchisement of women  in early 20
th  century America led  to a sharp rise  in  state health 
expenditure and a steep drop in infant mortality (Miller 2008). And, strikingly, results of the 
                                                 
1 On (i), see Thomas 1990, Thomas and Welch 1991, Hoddinott 1995, Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997, 
Case 1998, Svaleryd 2002, Besley and Case 2003). One possible explanation of this is paternity uncertainty 
(Alexander 1974). On (ii), see Besley and Case 2000, Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, Edlund and Pande 
2002,  Edlund,  Haider  and  Pande  2005,  Warner  and  Steel  1999,  Washington  2008,  Oswald  and 
Powdthavee 2010. This has been linked to women being, on average, less likely to pay taxes and more 
likely to receive benefits (e.g. Alessina and La Ferrara 2005). 
2 Early childhood death accounts for 30% of all deaths in poor countries compared with 1% in richer 
countries  (Cutler  et  al.  2007).  There  are  vast  inequalities  in  health  within  poor  countries  and  most 
childhood deaths occur in poor households.  
3 In the sample period, almost one in ten children died in India before the age of one. Structural estimates 
on data from the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh indicate that for every neonatal death (which we analyse 
here), women have an additional 0.37 births (Bhalotra and van Soest 2008). Maternal mortality as a 
fraction of births is estimated at 0.5% (UNICEF).  3 
 
British Election Survey of 2001 show that the single most important concern for men is low 
taxes while, for women, it is the quality of the National Health Service (Campbell 2004).
4  
Most of the available evidence pertains to the agency of women as mothers and voters. 
But, even if women in society have different preferences from men it does not necessarily follow 
that female politicians will make different policy choices than male politicians. Under complete 
policy commitment, policy choices reflect voter preferences and not politician identity but recent 
models of democracy relax the assumption of complete policy commitment (Besley and Coate 
1997, Osborne and Slivinski 1996). Hence evidence of the relevance of leader gender in politics 
is  informative  of  which  of  alternative  characterisations  of  the  democratic  process  is  more 
accurate. There is as yet only a small literature that delivers causal estimates of the political 
agency of women (Duflo and Chattopadhyay 2004, Rehavi 2007, Beaman et al. 2009, Svaleryd  
2009, Iyer et. al. 2011, Deininger et al. 2011, Clots Figueras 2011, Clots Figueras forthcoming). We 
contribute to this literature in providing the first systematic analysis of the influence of women 
elected to state legislative assemblies on the provision and effectiveness of public health services 
for women and children.
5 
The  failure  of  public  health  provision  in  developing  countries  is  gaining  increasing 
attention in the global arena (Black et al. 2003) and in India (DasGupta 2007). Poverty is not a 
compelling explanation for the scale of (maternal and) child death given that most deaths can be 
averted by low cost interventions (Cutler et al. 2006). The evidence points to political failure 
(Kiefer  and  Khemani  2003)  but  there  is  limited  discussion  of  the  potential  significance  of 
women’s representation in improving the delivery of health services.  
This is topical given that the Women's Reservation Bill proposing that a third of seats in 
state assemblies and parliament be reserved for women is currently under debate. The Bill was 
introduced in September 1996 and passed by the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) in March 2010 but 
is pending in the Lok Sabha (Lower House). Political reservations for women were successfully 
introduced  in  local  government  as  part  of  a  decentralisation  package  reflected  in  the  73
rd 
Constitutional Amendment, effective 1993. This was a victory for India’s women’s movement, 
which emphasised the grassroots involvement of  village women in village level development 
programmes. The more limited support for the move to introduce reservations in state and 
national parliaments reflects, in part, a concern that women who claim those seats will tend to be 
                                                 
4 At the turn of the century, fertility and infant mortality rates in America were similar to those in our 
estimation sample for India. In Britain in 2001, both were dramatically smaller. Even so, most women 
expect to engage with public health services at least once through pregnancy and this makes them heavier 
users, other conditions equal. The greater concern of women for public health in contemporary Britain 
may also reflect their representation of children and of the poor. 
5 We delineate further contributions of our work below and discuss earlier findings in section 2.  4 
 
elite and therefore unlikely to represent the interests of the majority of women citizens ((Mishra 
2000, Rai 2002). Here we effectively test the hypothesis that this implies their detachment from 
the interests of the common woman.  
The  available  evidence  of  women’s  political  agency  in  India  (cited  above)  does  not 
illuminate this question, as it largely pertains to women in village councils (Gram Panchayats). 
Also,  most  of  this  evidence  concerns  women’s  headship,  while  we  investigate  incremental 
changes in women’s political representation. In particular we investigate whether the district level 
share of state assembly constituencies in which a woman is elected influences individual health 
outcomes and village  public goods in  the  district. This is an importantly different question. 
Women occupy a small share of seats in state assemblies and it is conceivable that incremental 
changes in their share will have limited policy influence even if their headship counts. Our focus 
on political representation in state assemblies is relevant since this is the level at which most 
decisions pertaining to public health provision were made until 1993 (Rao and Singh 1998). Even 
after 1993, when powers over the implementation of developmental projects were devolved to 
the district and village level, state legislators continued to have substantial say and to play a 
potentially  important  role  in  negotiation  with  and  coordination  across  layers  of  local 
government. In the empirical analysis we allow for a break in the coefficient of interest in 1993, 
and a further contribution of our work is that it provides evidence of the policy relevance of 
women’s political representation for a longer period of India’s democratic history, prior to 1993.   
Since the reservation of a third of the headships of village councils within each state was 
randomised (by dictate), studies of politician gender in Indian panchayats have exploited quasi 
experimental data to identify causal effects. However, as the authors recognise, reservation may 
have  direct  effects  on  policy  outcomes  by  changing  the  nature  of  political  competition 
(Franceschet et al.  2009).  The current project  investigates  the policy  influence  of  competitively 
elected women. This leads us to different identification issues.  
The main identification challenge is that the gender of a competitively elected leader is 
potentially endogenous. For instance, more progressive electorates may be more likely to elect 
women and, independently, more likely to invest in child health. A further potential problem is 
that the composition of births is endogenous to the political regime. We address these problems 
using a fixed effects instrumental variables estimator that exploits constituency level information 
on close elections between men and women on the one hand and information on siblings in a 
large sample survey on the other (section 4). The estimation sample contains more than 70000 
individual births to some 18000 mothers that occur across 246 districts (in 16 states) over the 32 
year period, 1967 1998 matched to electoral data.  5 
 
We find that a one standard deviation increase in women’s political representation in the 
birth year (and similarly in the two years preceding birth) results in a 1.5 percentage point (24%) 
reduction in neonatal mortality, which is a 0.06 standard deviation change. These changes in 
neonatal mortality drive similarly large impacts on infant mortality. To put this effect size in 
perspective,  consider  that  the  causal  impact  of  democratization  on  infant  mortality  in  sub 
Saharan Africa in the post Cold War period is estimated to be a 1.2% point drop in infant 
mortality, which is 12% of the sample mean (Kudamatsu forthcoming).  
These  estimates  stand  up  to  a  battery  of  robustness  checks  and  we  report  several 
extensions. We also identify mechanisms consistent with politician gender exerting an impact on 
both  the  health  infrastructure  and  the  information  and  encouragement  that  recent  studies 
suggest is important in determining the demand for public health services. Using village level 
data and instrumenting as before using close elections, we find that women politicians are more 
likely to invest in the village level public health infrastructure while men are more likely to invest 
in the financial (and telecommunications) infrastructure. However public health facilities in India 
are often poorly staffed (Das and Hammer 2007, Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo 2003) and uptake 
of  publicly  provided  services  such  as  immunization  low  (Banerjee  et  al.  2011).  So  we  also 
investigated a range of indicators of the utilization of publicly provided health inputs, all of 
which have established impacts on childhood mortality risk. Using a smaller sample of more 
recent births and a similar identification strategy to that in the main analysis, we find that raising 
female  political  representation  results  in  substantially  improved  probabilities  of  attending 
antenatal care, taking iron supplements during pregnancy, giving birth in a government facility as 
opposed to at home (note: we establish no change in the probability of giving birth in a private 
facility), early initiation of breastfeeding, and full immunization by the age of one. We argue that 
impacts on early breastfeeding and antenatal care, for instance, are  consistent with politician led 
information campaigns.  
Overall, we establish the effectiveness of women politicians in delivering public health. 
Our results reject the Downsian model in favour of more recent citizen candidate models of 
political identity. They resonate with a diverse literature, different segments of which suggest that 
women exhibit a stronger propensity to invest in children and  have more progressive social 
preferences.  
2. Background: Women and Politics in India  
India is the largest and oldest democracy in the developing world. It is a federal country 
in which the constitution devolves significant control over their own government to the 28 states 
and  7  union  territories  and  population  health  in  particular  falls  under  the  purview  of  State 6 
 
Legislative Assemblies. States and union territories are divided into single member constituencies 
in  which  candidates  are  elected  in  first past the post  elections.  The  boundaries  of  assembly 
constituencies are drawn to make sure that there are, as near as practicable, the same number of 
inhabitants in each constituency. Thus, state assemblies vary in size with the state population. 
Districts are an important level of local government between state and village governments.  
Women  are  severely  under represented  in  politics  the  world  over  and  India  is  no 
different (section 3a).
6 Using data from two states and comparing villages with and without 
reserved headship for women, Duflo and Chattopadhyay (2004) and Beaman et al. (2007) find 
that the composition of public infrastructure at the village level is a function of the gender of the 
leader,  with  women  being  more  likely  to  invest  in  drinking  water  and  roads.  Other  studies 
identify impacts of women’s village council headship on political participation (Beaman et al. 
2007, 2009, Deininger et al. 2011) and the willingness of women to report crimes against them 
(Iyer et al. 2011). The only previous analysis of women in state assemblies in India is in Clots 
Figueras (2011), Clots Figueras (forthcoming) who establishes impacts on state budgets and urban 
primary education respectively using close election data. We motivate a substantive focus on 
health  and  complement  close  election  data  with  sibling  data  to  account  for  mother level 
unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, which can affect the timing of births. In the wider 
international domain the only related study that we are aware of is Rehavi (2007) who also uses 
close election data and finds that state health expenditure in the United States is increasing in the 
share of women in state legislatures. Since state health expenditure has a bad press in developing 
countries  (Filmer  and  Pritchett  1999,  Filmer,  Hammer  and  Pritchett  2000),  we  investigate 
indicators  of  public  health  provision  that  more  directly  measure  the  effectiveness  of  state 
intervention, and at a more local level. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Political  Variables:  A  detailed  dataset  on  every  constituency  election  to  State 
Legislatures  in  India  during  1967 2001  was  gathered  from  publications  of  the  Election 
Commission of India. From this we draw the gender of the winning candidate and the runner up 
and the number of votes obtained by each. The data contain information on 29686 politicians 
who contested in the 16 larger states.
7 This is aggregated to the district level to produce the 
                                                 
6  There  are  improvements  on  this  front  and  India’s  rank  in  a  recent  index  of  women’s  political 
empowerment was not much below that of the UK. India held the rank of 113 in 134 countries in the 
Global Gender Gap Index for 2008, averaging over gaps in education, health, economic participation and 
political empowerment. Isolating political empowerment, India ranked 28th. In contrast, the UK ranked 
13th on average but 21st on political empowerment. 
7 These 16 states account for more than 90 per cent of the total population in India, about 935 million 
people.  They  are  Andhra  Pradesh,  Assam,  Bihar,  Gujarat,  Haryana,  Jammu  &  Kashmir,  Karnataka, 7 
 
district level share of state assembly  constituencies to which a woman  was elected  for each 
election year. This share persists till the following election. Elections are routinely every five 
years but states often hold mid term elections at shorter intervals. Each district has between 1 
and 37 electoral constituencies and the median is 9.  
The mean of the proportion of seats in a district won by women is 3.6% (s.d. 7.4%). The 
median  is  zero  and  the  75th  and  90th  percentiles  are,  respectively,  5.5  and  14.3%.  So  the 
distribution is highly skewed (Figure A1 in the Appendix). At least one woman was elected in 
26.4% of district electoral years and in this sub sample, the share of seats held by women is 
13.8%. There is an upward trend in the share of seats held by women (Figure 1) and substantial 
differences in both the level and trend by state (Figure 2).  
We define close elections as elections in which the winner and the runner up are of 
opposite gender and the vote margin between them is less than 3.5%. Across the sample period, 
only 7.45% of district years had at least one close election. They have become more common 
over time: Fewer than 1 in 400 seats had close elections between women and men in the 1960s 
and 1970s, but that figure jumped to more than 1 in 100 for the 1980s and 1990s.  
  Health Outcomes and Facilities: Individual data on child survival are obtained from 
retrospective  fertility  histories  reported  in  the  second  round  of  the  Indian  National  Family 
Health Survey (NFHS) by a representative sample of ever married women aged 15 49 in 1998 
99.
8 This makes it straightforward to identify siblings. The histories provide information on the 
year of birth and death for births that occur across three decades, so these data can be matched 
to the time variation in the political data. The data indicate the district of current residence and 
the years that the mother has lived in her current location. We drop mothers who had births in a 
location other than the current residence, but we investigate this restriction. To allow for full 
exposure to neonatal [infant] morality risk we exclude children born less than a month [a year] 
before  the  date  of  the  survey.  The  NFHS  also  provides  information  on  health seeking 
behaviours in the four years preceding the survey date and on village facilities at the time of the 
survey. These are defined in the data appendix and discussed further in the results section. The 
NFHS data are merged with the political data by district and (lagged) birth year to produce a 
micro panel of births within mother nested within a district level panel. There is an average of 
3.8 births per mother, conditional on at least 2. Descriptive statistics are in Table 1. A non 
parametric (lowess) plot of the relationship between neonatal mortality risk and the share of 
women  leaders  at  the  district  level  shows  that  for  most  of  the  range  of  the  data,  the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West 
Bengal. 
8 For further information, including sampling design, see IIPS and ORC Macro (2000). 8 
 
unconditional  relationship  is  negative  (Figure  A2).  We  now  investigate  whether  a  negative 
relationship persists after allowing for endogeneity and heterogeneity. 
4. Empirical Specification 
4.1 Identification  
We are interested in the relationship between indicators of individual level access to public 
health  services  and  women’s  political  representation  at  the  district  level.  If  common 
unobservables drive both electoral preferences for women and health related behaviours then 
our  estimates  will  be  biased.  To  address  this,  we  instrument  the  overall  share  of  women 
politicians with the share of women who win in close elections against men, that is, elections in 
which the winner and the runner up are of opposite gender and the margin of victory is small. 
The premise is that the identity (gender) of the leader is quasi random in close elections between 
the sexes. To see this, note that in a first past the post electoral system, the probability of being 
elected is a function of the vote difference between the winner and the runner up and this 
function  has  a  discontinuity  at  zero.  As  the  vote  difference  approaches  the  discontinuity, 
constituencies  in  which  a  woman  wins  by  a  small  vote  margin  are  increasingly  similar  to 
constituencies in which a man wins by a small margin (Lee 2001, Pettersson Lidbom 2001). 
Since we use not a binary outcome (man/woman) at the constituency level but the share of 
women at the district level, our specification is similar to a fuzzy regression discontinuity (e.g. 
Angrist and Pischke 2008: chapter 6), but one in which we aggregate to the district level over 
discontinuities at the constituency level. We control for a polynomial in the constituency specific 
margins of victory or defeat of each man woman close election in the district.  
Although  the  gender  of  the  winner  in  a  close  election  may  be  considered  random,  the 
existence of close elections between women and men may not, for example, it may depend on 
the number of female candidates in the district. To allow for this, we control for the fraction of 
seats in the district that had close elections between female and male candidates in the first and 
second stage of the instrumental variables procedure.  
Since we focus upon newborns, a further potential source of bias arises from endogenous 
heterogeneity in the timing of fertility. For instance, households may consciously advance or 
defer fertility in response to the policy [political] regime. Alternatively, selective foetal death 
[miscarriage  or  female  foeticide]  may  vary  with  reproductive  health  facilities  and  campaigns 
discouraging foeticide.
9 These responses may vary across mothers. So, whether by selection into 
conception  or  into  foetal  survival,  the  composition  of  live  births  in  the  sample  may  vary 
                                                 
9 Similar arguments concerning the conscious timing of fertility and selective survival of the foetus to 
birth in the context of booms and recessions are made in Dehejia and Lleras Muney (2004) and Bhalotra 
(2010) respectively. 9 
 
systematically with the gender composition of politicians. This will tend to bias the parameter of 
interest and the direction of this bias is, a priori, unclear. We limit this problem by using mother 
fixed effects. These will of course purge all fixed mother level unobservables including the time 
invariant  component  of  their  political  preferences  and  any  tendency  they  may  have  to 
compensate or reinforce state investments in children (crowding out or crowding in). This is a 
considerable improvement relative to using district fixed effects. 
The first set of estimated models is 
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The subscripts denote the individual child i of mother m born in district d (in state s) in year t. 
Mortality is an indicator for the index child dying by the age of one month (neonatal), women is the 
district level share of state assembly constituencies to which a woman was elected in the year 
before the child was born and b is the parameter of interest. The other variables in equation (1), 
in order, are mother and cohort fixed effects, a third order polynomial (F) in the victory margin 
(m) between the winner and the runner up for the man woman election j, interacted with Ijdt, an 
indicator for whether such an election exists, totalclose is the fraction of constituencies in the 
district that experienced a close election, X is a vector of child or mother specific controls, Z is a 
vector of district year varying controls and j are state specific trends. Equation (2) represents 
the  first  stage  of  the  IV  procedure.  It  shows  the  potentially  endogenous  regressor,  women, 
regressed upon the instrument, womenclose, and the same set of controls. The instrument is the 
fraction of constituencies in the district in which a woman won against a man in a close election.  
  The cohort dummies control for aggregate time variation associated with, for example, 
secular improvements in health technology, episodic shocks like famines, floods and epidemics 
and any aggregate economic  or political  regime changes. The state specific  trends allow  for 
omitted trends that vary by state, for example, GDP or trends in the status of women. The 
district level controls Z include the shares of the population that are female, urban and low caste 
and male and female literacy rates. Controls X include dummies for the gender, birth order, 
rural/urban location, religion, and caste of the child and an indicator for whether the child is one 10 
 
of a multiple birth. We use a linear model since fixed effects probit estimates are inconsistent in 
short panels (Nickell 1982) and the relevant panel in this case is the micro panel, where T is the 
number  of  children  per  mother.  Standard  errors  are  robust  to  arbitrary  forms  of 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the  district level to allow for correlation at any time and 
across time within district (e.g. Bertrand et al. 2004). This also allows for correlation of the 
standard errors across siblings because, by construction, siblings are all in the same district. 
  In sum, the estimated specification delivers an estimate of the change in mortality risk 
across children of the same mother born at different times and so potentially under different 
political regimes, with the change in political regime constructed as a quasi random assignment 
of the gender of politicians in the district of birth. We investigate the identifying assumptions 
that underlie the use of close elections. In view of our use of mother fixed effects, we check on 
the further identifying assumption that there are no omitted mother specific trends the effects of 
which may load onto the variable of interest. We conduct a range of sensitivity checks including 
a placebo test and we explore the timing of effects and investigate heterogeneity in impact by 
individual characteristics and over time.  
  We then estimate equations that replace mortality in equation (1) with a vector of village 
public goods on the one hand and a vector of antenatal and early postnatal health inputs on the 
other. The identification strategies we use to analyse these further outcomes are similar and are 
detailed below, alongside the results. 
5. Results 
5.1. Survival Outcomes 
  Estimates of equations (1) and (2) are in Table 2; refer the richest specification in column 
(5).  Raising  the  share  of  seats  held  by women  at  the  district  level  (women)  by  one  standard 
deviation (0.0740) is estimated to result in declines in neonatal [infant] mortality of 1.5 [1.4]%. 
This is 24[14]% of the mean rate in the sample, which is 6.3[9.8]% and it corresponds to a 
0.063[0.048] change in the s.d. of neonatal [infant] mortality. Since the distribution of women is 
skewed  (Figure  A1),  we  consider  the  survival  improvements  brought  about  by  electing  one 
additional woman. The median district has nine constituencies and so nine seats. As it happens, 
close to 10% of districts in the sample have exactly nine seats and in this set the mean (0.034) 
and median (0) share of seats held by women is very similar to the sample mean (0.036) and 
median (0). If one additional woman wins, the median number of seats goes from 0 to 1 and the 
share from 0 to 1/9=0.11. If we plug this in to the estimated equations, we get even larger 
numbers. The predicted decline in neonatal [infant] mortality is now 2.3 [2.1]%. We investigate 11 
 
this later (section 5.3) and find that the effects of politician gender on infant mortality are entirely 
determined by its effects on neonatal mortality.  
  Table 2 shows how the estimates for neonatal mortality evolve as the specification is 
enriched to improve identification. The OLS coefficient is small and insignificant and there is no 
significant change in it when the sample is restricted to mothers with at least two births. The 
2SLS coefficient without mother fixed effects  is larger by a factor of eight and borders on 
significance. It rises by about one standard deviation and becomes statistically significant once 
we introduce mother fixed effects. Introducing the household and district level controls listed 
earlier makes no significant difference although the coefficient is slightly larger.
10 
The OLS coefficient is expected to be biased by the endogeneity of voter preferences (or 
self selection of women into political candidacy). Our finding that it is biased downwards is 
consistent with women being more likely to be elected (or to come forward) in districts with 
poorer baseline health. Another possibility is that women who run in close races against men are 
positively selected on characteristics. The relationship between the local average identified off 
close races and the average effect depends on the underlying theoretical model, and our findings 
are consistent with a citizen candidate model. The cost of a close race is higher than of non close 
races so a candidate needs a higher payoff to play, suggesting that only candidates with far apart 
preferences  will  play  (e.g.  Rehavi  2007).  In  general  IV  coefficients  will  be  larger  when  the 
variable of interest is measured with error but we expect that measurement error in counting 
women winners in Indian elections is small. Indeed if measurement error were important then, 
as  this  is  exacerbated  by  differencing,  we would expect  attenuation  of  the  coefficient  upon 
introduction of mother fixed effects. Instead the coefficient is larger still. This may indicate that 
parents reinforce endowments in allocations across siblings, consistent with other evidence that 
points in this same direction (Datar et al. 2007, Aizer and Cunha 2010).  
The first stage of the 2SLS estimates is reported in the lower panel of Table 2. The 
instrument  is  powerful  and  the  share  of  women  who  win  across  all  elections  moves 
proportionately to the share of women who win in close elections. With the share of women 
winners in close elections constant, the share of all women winners is negatively associated with 
the total share of close elections within a district since this now varies only with the share of 
male winners. We also report the reduced form of the equation system (1), (2) (see Table 3, panel 
B column 6). 
                                                 
10 Table 2 reports only the coefficient on the regressor of interest. Appendix Table A7 reports the full set 
of  coefficients.  Given  that  the  effect  we  find  for  infant  mortality  is  mainly  capturing  the  effect  on 
neonatal mortality, from now own we will only report results for neonatal mortality. Robustness checks 
using infant mortality as a dependent variable are in appendix Tables A9 and A10. 12 
 
5.2. Robustness Checks  
  We subjected the baseline specification to a number of checks (Table 3).  
  Specification of electoral variables: Since regression discontinuity underlies the close election 
IV approach, we investigate parameterisation of the vote margin between the winner and runner 
up. The baseline specification uses a third order polynomial but the coefficient of interest is not 
sensitive to replacing this with a first or second order polynomial (columns 1 2). The premise 
that the gender of the leader is random in a close election only holds in a small window around 
the point where the vote margin between the winner and the runner up is zero, but there is an 
efficiency robustness trade off in deciding the width of the window. We therefore investigate the 
chosen threshold for identification of close elections, varying this downwards and upwards from 
the selected 3.5% to include the range 2 to 4%. The coefficient on women is almost identical 
when we use a 2% margin, and it is insignificantly different for the other choices (columns 3 6). 
We restricted the sample to district year observations (41% of the baseline sample) in which 
there was at least one election between a man and a woman as these are the observations upon 
which identification rests, and we find this makes no significant difference (col. 7). To control 
for the possibility that certain political parties strategically appoint women candidates more than 
others (Rai  2002),  we condition upon  the  district share  of seats occupied by each of seven 
parties.
11 We also control for the district share of state assembly seats reserved for low caste 
candidates to allow for the possibility that women and men compete differently for these seats. 
These changes do not alter the coefficient of interest (column 8). Using the outer fence of the 
interquartile range, we removed outliers in women’s representation above the 75
th percentile. 
This  amounts  to  removing  the  1.45%  of  observations  with  women  greater  than  28%,  and  it 
corresponds  to  the  visually  evident  outliers  in  Figure  A2.  The  estimates  are  little  changed 
(column 9). 
  Within-mother trends: In a model with mother fixed effects, identification of calendar 
time effects can only come from mothers having children at different moments in time but there 
is necessarily a trend in birth order and the mother’s age at birth between siblings. This makes it 
important to isolate the effects of time variation in women’s political representation from the 
effects of birth order and the age of the mother at each birth. We already control flexibly for 
birth order, using dummies for each order. We now introduce age at birth dummies and more 
flexible controls for mother’s age at birth, namely, dummies for mother’s cohort*child cohort 
(columns 1 2 of panel B, Table 3). This sort of nonparametric control allows for the functional 
                                                 
11 Following Besley and Burgess (2002), seven party groups are constructed: Congress, Hard Left, Soft 
Left, Janata, Hindu, Regional parties, and Independents coupled with other small parties (data appendix). 13 
 
relationship between survival and mother’s age to have changed over time with improvements in 
the survival technology.
12  
Unobserved trends: We further investigated strengthening controls for unobservable trends 
in  general.  We  extend  the  baseline  specification  to  include  state specific  quadratic  trends, 
state*year dummies and district*mother’s cohort dummies (columns 3 5, panel B). The last is 
important because a potential problem with using only district fixed effects is that different 
cohorts of mothers in different districts, having been exposed to different income and health 
conditions, are more or less likely to have children with lower survival chances.
13 To further 
mitigate concerns that we are capturing omitted trends, we implemented a placebo, modelling 
the neonatal mortality risk of cohorts born in t as a function of future politician gender (t+1 to 
t+9). These coefficients are all essentially zero (Table 4)
14.  
The estimates in Table 2 are on the sample of mothers that have had all their births in 
their current place of residence. This is a rather strong restriction. We relax it to include only 
children who were born in the current place of residence of the mother. In order to investigate 
the extent of any selectivity in migration, we also estimate the model with no restrictions. The 
coefficient of interest grows smaller as we successively lift restrictions on the sample but it 
remains significant and within two standard errors of the baseline coefficient (Table A8 in the 
Appendix). This puts aside any concern that our selection of a non migrant mother sample is 
either creating a bias or producing results that may be altogether unrepresentative. 
  Close election data: Following the initial use of the close election identification strategy in 
the  context  of  close  elections  between  Democrats  and  Republicans  in  the  US  (Lee  2001), 
concerns have been raised that the outcomes of close elections may be biased in favour of 
incumbents or in favour of candidates from parties that have strategic control over the election 
process  (Snyder  2005,  Caughey  and  Sekhon  2010,  Grimmer  et  al.  2011).  We  investigate 
incumbency and party affiliation in addition to other observables but find no evidence of this in 
the case of close elections between men and women in India. A simple regression shows that the 
                                                 
12 Controls for mother’s age at birth are also important in correcting for the fact that retrospective fertility 
(and mortality) data grow increasingly unrepresentative of mother’s age as we go further back in time 
(Rindfuss et al. 1982). 
13 See Bhalotra and Rawlings (2010) on the importance of mother’s birth year conditions for offspring 
health and see Kudamatsu (forthcoming) for a similar discussion in the context of mother fixed effects 
estimation of the impact of democratization on mortality. 
14 We investigated a further placebo, estimating our model on the sample of mothers that moved to the 
current location a year or more after the birth of their youngest child. Their births are effectively matched 
to politicians that they were never exposed to. Again, the coefficient on women is small and insignificant 
(Table A8 column 1). However, the problem with this test is that we do not know whether the previous 
location was in the same district or in a different one, which adds noise to the estimates. 
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proportion of women in a district who won in a close election against a man is independent of 
the history of close elections in the district, the history of women being elected, the share of 
seats that each of eight parties contested in close elections and a host of district time varying 
demographic  variables  (Table  A1).  Candidate  and  constituency  characteristics  are  also 
independent of the gender of the winner in close elections. This includes the number of other 
female candidates in the constituency, whether the winner was the incumbent, the number of 
close  elections  in  the  past,  the  votes  received  by  the  winner  and  the  total  votes  in  the 
constituency  (Table  A2).  These  results  lend  support  to  the  identifying  assumption  that  the 
gender of the winner in close elections between men and women is random.  
  Although district specific unobservables are absorbed by mother fixed effects, we also 
show that districts that had a close election are matched on observables to districts that did not. 
The observables include district demographics, the share of villages with hospitals and schools 
and the share of seats won by each gender in elections that were not close (Table A3). Similarly, 
while we control in the regressions for the district level vote shares of each of eight parties, it is 
useful  to  observe  that  there  are  no  systematic  correlations  between  political  party  and  the 
incidence of close elections (Table A4). 
5.3. Extensions 
Timing: The reported specification investigates the influence of the gender composition 
of politicians in the year before birth (let’s call this t-1) since neonatal mortality is primarily 
determined by antenatal services and the health of the mother during pregnancy. We extend the 
model to allow for persistence in the impact of politician gender. Some persistence is built in by 
virtue of state elections typically  taking place every five years.
15 We  re estimate the  baseline 
model, allowing neonatal mortality to depend upon politicians in power as long as five years 
before birth (t-5). We find that politician gender in the two years before birth and in the birth 
year (t-2, t-1, t) has a similar sized significant impact but that the share of women in power more 
than two years before the index birth has no impact. (Table 4). This particular pattern of fading 
is consistent with, for instance,  politicians  targeting  married women  with information  about 
antenatal behaviours. This is because the median duration between marriage and first birth in 
India is one to two years. 
  Timing, mechanisms and birth order: The evidence (below) suggests that women politicians 
enhance health facilities and disseminate information on healthy behaviours. Since both facilities 
and information are likely to persist within mother for the relatively short space of time between 
                                                 
15 The gender mix of politicians elected in a given election year will, on average, persist through the next 
five years. So politicians in power at t-5 will tend to exit before or in the birth year t, politicians in power 
in t-4 will tend to exit before or in t+1, and so on. 15 
 
births (mean of about two years), we may expect exposure to women politicians to have its 
largest impact on the health of first births. This is indeed what we find (see the first two columns 
of Table 5). In their analysis of women’s social networks, Aizer and Currie (2004) adduce a 
similar distinction between first and higher order births, focusing on information diffusion.  
Heterogeneity by other child characteristics: We allow the effects of politician gender to differ by 
the caste, gender and rural/urban location of the child for the following reasons. Differentiation 
by caste of the child is a crude test of the progressiveness of women politicians since low caste 
children are relatively poor. Earlier studies suggest that as women’s power in decision making 
within the household increases marginal gains for girls exceed those for boys (e.g. Duflo 2003, 
Thomas  1990).  So,  if  politician  identity  influences  policy  outcomes  then  it  is  plausible  that 
women politicians make a larger difference for girls, for example, by campaigning against son 
preference or by encouraging immunization of girls. The scope for politicians to impact health is 
greater in rural areas since public services are weaker and health outcomes poorer. We find larger 
point estimates for boys, for low caste (SC and ST) children and for children born in urban areas, 
but in no case is the group difference statistically significant.  
Pre/post devolution: We also investigated heterogeneity in the treatment effect in the time 
dimension. The 1993 Constitutional Amendment described in sections 1 and 2 devolved control 
over the implementation of development programmes to the panchayat level and this included 
aspects  of  health  provision  such  as  drinking  water  and  immunization  delivered  through  the 
Integrated Child Development Services programme. We therefore allow for a weakening of the 
influence  of  politicians  in  state  assemblies  post devolution.  The  estimated  coefficient  is  not 
significantly  different  pre/post 1993.  This  suggests  that  women’s  political  representation 
mattered for the entire three decades in our sample and that the power of politicians elected to 
state assemblies to influence health services was not substantially eroded upon the empowerment 
of village councils. 
  We estimated the model for post neonatal mortality and found no effects of politician 
gender  (Table  A6).
16  However these  estimates are  biased  by endogenous selection into post 
neonatal exposure to mortality risk because children only enter this sample if they have survived 
the neonatal period, and we have seen that neonatal survival is dependent upon politician gender. 
Our observation of larger impacts of women’s representation on neonatal than on post neonatal 
mortality is also consistent with the tighter identification of neonatal mortality with state level 
investments in women (maternal health and place of delivery). As children age into the post 
                                                 
16 Mortality in the first month of life is neonatal and between the second and twelfth month is post 
neonatal. Infant mortality is the sum of these. Mortality risk  declines sharply with age, and neonatal 
mortality contributes two thirds of infant deaths. 16 
 
neonatal period, they are exposed to a more diverse set of household level influences including for 
example income, nutrition and aspects of parenting behaviour like hygiene. It is therefore harder 
to attribute improvements in post neonatal health to public provision and this weakens politician 
incentives. 
  The probability that a child is born, and the sex of the child conditional upon birth 
may depend upon women’s political representation. As we have the entire fertility history of each 
mother, we expanded the data so that for every woman there is an observation for every year in 
which she is exposed to the risk of birth (starting with her age at marriage and stopping at age 49 
or the date of interview). There is no significant fertility response. However, the probability that 
a birth is female is increasing in the share of women politicians (Appendix Table A11)
17.  
6. Health Inputs 
6.1 Village Public Goods 
We  now  investigate  how  women’s  political  representation  influences  tangible  (and 
durable) supply side investments. For this we use the under exploited village facilities survey of 
the NFHS to look at rural infrastructure choices, similarly to Duflo and Chattopadhyay (2004). 
The estimation sample contains 1591 villages (in the 246 districts), 76% of which are surveyed in 
1998 and the rest in 1997. So we do not have much time variation in these data but there is 
district variation. Facility is an indicator for a specified facility in village v in district d in year t. 
Using year and district fixed effects and instrumenting for the district share of women as before, 
we estimate this linear equation system using 2SLS  
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We find that village public facilities are a significant function of the share of women politicians in 
the district in which the village lies (Table 6). The estimates are sharp and consistent across 
categories. A 10% increase in women raises the probability that the village has a primary health 
                                                 
17 A ready explanation of this would be that women politicians have been more committed to controlling 
female feticide. To test this hypothesis, we divided the sample at 1985, because ultrasound scanners 
started to be imported in 1987 and thereafter widely used for prenatal sex detection and it is only after the 
mid 80s that there is a significant trend departure of the sex ratio at birth from the biologically normal 
level (Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010). Our expectation was that we would see a positive impact of female 
political representation on the female male ratio at birth after and only after 1985. However the post 85 
coefficients are imprecise and we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal before and after 1985. 
We are therefore unable to nail down an explanation of this finding.  
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centre, a community health centre, a government dispensary and a government hospital by 0.22, 
0.19, 0.18 and 0.057 respectively. With a view to identifying the sorts of village infrastructure that 
male politicians are more likely to provide, we ran the regressions reported in the lower panel of 
Table 6. A 10% increase in the share of women politicians (which decreases the share of male 
politicians)  significantly  lowers  the  probability  that  the  village  has  a  bank.  We  also  observe 
sizeable negative coefficients on indicators for post offices and telephone facilities, although 
these  are  poorly  determined.  In  sum,  the  evidence  suggests  that  women  politicians  are 
significantly more likely to invest in the public health infrastructure while men are more likely to 
invest  in  the  financial  and  telecommunications  infrastructure.  This  ties  in  with  our  initial 
hypothesis. 
6.2. Individual Indicators of Antenatal and Postnatal Care 
With a view to identifying policy amenable inputs to neonatal mortality, we investigated a 
range of prenatal and early postnatal health seeking behaviours.
18 These data are only available 
for births that occur in the four years preceding the survey date (1994/5 1998/9). There are 
siblings in this sample (for 15.3% of mothers) but they are characterised by short intervening 
birth intervals and given the evidence that a short preceding birth interval compromises the 
health of a child (e.g. Bhalotra and van Soest 2008), this is a selected sample. So, while we use the 
close elections instrument as before, instead of mother fixed effects, we use fixed effects for 
finely defined mother groups, an approach similar to that taken in Kudamatsu (forthcoming). We 
construct around 1000 fixed effects for groups defined on a multidimensional space of mother 
traits,  namely  height  (above/below  mean),  education  (above/below  primary),  caste  (SC,  ST, 
OBC  or  high  caste),  urban/rural  location  and  the  birth  year  of  the  mother.  The  estimated 
equation system looks similar to (1) and (2), the only differences being in the dependent variable 
and in mother group fixed effects replacing straightforward mother fixed effects. 
The results are in Table 7 and the mean and s.d. of each dependent variable is in Table 1. 
As in Table 2, OLS estimates (not shown) are smaller than the IV estimates and tend to be 
insignificant. The table displays 2SLS estimates with and without the quasi  mother fixed effects. 
Here we discuss the richer specification and present effects flowing from a 10 percentage point 
increase in women’s representation (which, we explained above, is the approximate change in 
share associated with moving the number of women politicians elected in the median district 
from 0 to 1).  
                                                 
18 Since the samples we use for estimation of equations for survival and for health inputs are constrained 
to be different, we cannot conduct an accounting exercise measuring the contributions of the inputs to 
neonatal  mortality  but  the  association  of  the  inputs  we  consider  with  neonatal  mortality  is  widely 
documented.  18 
 
Antenatal care, iron and tetanus: The Indian government defines a complete course of 
antenatal care as including at least 3 antenatal visits, a 3 month supply of iron tablets and two 
tetanus injections. Only 37% of women in our sample achieve a complete course. We find that 
women’s political representation increases the number of antenatal visits a woman makes by 
0.28, which is 12% of the mean. It raises the probability that iron supplements are taken by 
about 10% points, relative to a mean of 57%. This is important given the high prevalence of 
anemia amongst Indian mothers (NFHS data) and the fact that it is a risk factor for low birth 
weight offspring and child survival (Bhalotra and Rawlings (2011). The probability that a woman 
has at least one tetanus injection during pregnancy (which is important in lowering the risk of 
neonatal tetanus) is increasing in women but not significantly.  
Breastfeeding:  Women’s  political  representation  raises  the  probability  of  early 
breastfeeding by 13.4% points, which is a 28% increase. Although the vast majority of Indian 
women  breastfeed  and  77%  of  children  are  being  breastfed  at  20 23  months  (UNICEF 
indicators), there are cultural inhibitions to breastfeeding immediately after birth and only 48% 
of Indian women in our sample initiate breastfeeding in the first 24 hours. This is when the 
benefits of breastfeeding are greatest, lowering the risk of contracting infectious diseases such as 
diarrhoea and pneumonia and, thereby, lowering neonatal mortality risk (Jones et al. 2003).   
Place of birth: Some 69% of births to Indian women in our sample occur at home, 
while the remaining 31% are distributed equally between public and private facilities.
19 Since 
home births are typically unattended by professionals, they generate neonatal survival risks that 
can  be  averted  in  the  presence  of  birth  attendants  trained  in  the  management  of  sepsis 
(septicaemia, meningitis, pneumonia); see Bang et al. (1999).  
We find that a 10% increase in women’s political representation lowers home deliveries 
by 8.8% points. Moreover, there is evidence that this represents a shift of births into government 
hospitals: the same increase in women raises the probability of giving birth in a government facility 
by 11% points while there is no significant change in the probability of giving birth in a private 
facility. Contrast this with the impact of a 10% increase in state income: this similarly lowers 
home deliveries (by a more modest 1.1% points) but this arises entirely from a shift towards 
private  sector  deliveries;  there  is  no  change  in  the  share  of  births  in  government  hospitals 
(Bhalotra 2010). This suggests that putting women at the helm leads to improved access to 
government hospitals, consistent with the results in section 6.1.  
                                                 
19 The share of home births is higher in rural areas, at 78%, compared with 33% in urban areas. The share 
of the residual births in public and private facilities is similar in rural and urban areas. 19 
 
Immunization:  A  10  percentage  point  increase  in  women  increases  the  number  of 
vaccinations a child has by 1.8, against a mean of 5.3 and a maximum of 8. In the estimation 
sample, only 41% are fully immunized and 12.5% have had no immunizations
20 
Since  breastfeeding  does  not  require  public  infrastructure,  the  impact  of  women’s 
representation on breastfeeding suggests a role for information campaigns. This is probably also 
an important component of the other improvements we observe. The survey data we use (the 
NFHS) asked women what inhibited them in making antenatal care visits and an astounding 60% 
said that they did not think it was necessary. This suggests that information campaigns have the 
potential to generate large improvements in antenatal care.
21 A recent study of immunization in 
India concludes that uptake of publicly provided services is low because people do not seem to 
fully recognise their benefits (Banerjee et al. 2011). An advantage of studying outcomes (does a 
child survive, does a mother receive iron supplements, etc.) is that it captures the effects not only 
of  infrastructure  or  expenditure  choices  but  also  of  policy  influences  that  are  less  often 
documented,  including  information  campaigns.  Information  is  particularly  important  in  the 
health domain. For example, Miller (2008) finds that door to door campaigns advocating home 
hygiene played a critical role in the steep decline in infant mortality in American history.
22  
7. Conclusions 
We investigated whether women politicians invest more in antenatal care and early child 
health because women incur the costs of reproduction and replacement fertility and they make 
greater  investments  in  the  early  life  health  of  their  offspring.  We  identify  significant  causal 
impacts of women’s political representation on neonatal survival, indicators of prenatal and early 
postnatal  care,  and  the  village  level  public  health  infrastructure.  We  control  for  voter  (and 
mother) characteristics but are unable to control for politician characteristics. Therefore some 
part of the relationships that we identify may flow from women who win in close [political] races 
against men being positively selected. 
As discussed, women’s representation is a live issue in the Indian Parliament. On the 
wider international scale, quotas for women in government have been established in more than 
100 countries in the last 15 years (Dahlerup and Francisco 2005). Even if competitively elected 
women  are  positively  selected,  our  findings  are  relevant  to  debates  concerning  political 
                                                 
20 Since immunizations are spread across the first year of life, the sample upon which the immunization 
equations are estimated is the sample of (surviving) births aged 12 24 months. 
21 Access to publicly provided care is clearly relevant too since the next highest frequency, 16%, was 
recorded for it costing too much. Only 3.5% said it was too inconvenient or too far and 1.6% said it was 
because a health worker did not visit. 
22 There may be complementarities in the outcomes we look at and between provision of facilities and 
information, for example, mothers who give birth in a facility rather than at home are more likely to 
receive information and encouragement to initiate breastfeeding soon after birth.  20 
 
reservations for women for two reasons. First, increasing the political representation of women 
may increase  female voter turnout (a  question we  are currently  exploring,) and so  shift the 
preferences of the median voter in the direction of women’s preferences. Second, there are likely 
dynamic  effects  or  effects  of  having  women  in  power  that  persist  after  they  have  gone,  in 
particular,  exposure  to  women  may  reduce  voter  bias  against  them  (Beaman  et  al.  2009, 
Bhavnani 2009, Deininger et al. 2011).  
 
References 
Aizer, A., and J. Currie (2004). “Networks or neighborhoods? Correlations in the use of publicly funded  
maternity care in California.” Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2573 2585. 
Aizer, A., and F. Cunha (2010), “Child endowments, parental investments and the development of human     
      capital.” Mimeograph, Brown University. 
Alesina, A., and E. Ferrara (2005). “Preference for redistribution in the land of opportunities.” Journal of  
      Public Economics 89, 897 931.    
Alexander, R.D (1974). “The evolution of social behavior.” Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 5,  
      325 383. 
Andreoni, James, and Lise Vesterlund (2001). “Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Differences in Altruism.”    
      The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116, 293 312. 
Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn Steffen Pischke (2008). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion     
      Princeton University Press. 
Banerjee, A. L.,  Angus Deaton, and Esther Duflo (2003), “Health Care Delivery in rural Rajasthan.”  
      Mimeograph, MIT. 
Banerjee, A. L., Duflo, E., Glennerster, R., and Kothari, D. (2010). “Improving Immunization Coverage  
      in Rural India: A Clustered Randomized Controlled Evaluation of Immunization Campaigns with    
      and without Incentives.” British Medical Journal, 340, c2220. 
Bang, Abhay, T., Rani A. Bang, Sanjay B. Baitule, M. Hanimi Reddy, Mahesh D. Deshmukh (1999),   
      “Effect of home based neonatal care and management of sepsis on neonatal mortality: field trial in  
      rural India.” The Lancet, 354, 1955 1961. 
Black, R.E., Morris S.S., Bryce J. (2003). “Where and why are 10 million children dying every year?”  
      Lancet 361:2226 2234. 
Beaman, L., E. Duflo, R. Pande, and P. Topalova (2007). “Powerful Women Politicians, Gender Bias, and  
      Policy making in Rural India.” Background Paper, The State of The World’s Children, UNICEF. 
Beaman, L., R. Chattopadhyay, E. Duflo, R. Pande, and P. Topalova (2009). “Powerful Women: Does  
      Exposure Reduce Bias?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 1497 540.  
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004). “How much can we trust difference in difference  
      estimators?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 249 275. 
Besley, T., and A. Case (2000). “A. Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous  
      Policies. The Economic Journal, 110, 672 694.  
Besley, T., and A. Case (2003). “Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United  
      States.” Journal of Economic Literature, 41, 7 73. 
Besley, T., and S. Coate (1997). “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy.”Quarterly Journal  
      of Economics, 112(1). 
Besley, T., and Robin Burgess (2002). “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory  
      and Evidence from India”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1415 1451. 
Bhalotra, S., and Arthur van Soest (2008). “Birth Spacing, Fertility and Neonatal Mortality In India: 
      Dynamics, Frailty and Fecundity.” Journal of Econometrics, 143, 274 290.   
Bhalotra, S. (2010). “Fatal Fluctuations: Cyclicality in Infant Mortality in India.” Journal of Development  
      Economics. 93, 7 19 
Bhalotra, Sonia, and Tom Cochrane (2010). “Where Have All the Young Girls Gone? Identification of  
      Sex Selection in India.” IZA Discussion Paper #5381. 
Bhalotra, S, and S. Rawlings (2010). “Intergenerational persistence in health in developing countries: The  21 
 
      penalty of gender inequality?” Journal of Public Economics, 95, 286 299. 
Bhavnani, R. R. (2009). “Do Electoral Quotas Work after They Are Withdrawn? Evidence from a Natural  
      Experiment in India.” American Political Science Review, 103, 23 35.  
Campbell, R. (2004). “Gender, Ideology and Issue Preference: Is There Such a Thing as a Political  
      Women’s Interest in Britain?” British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6, 20–46. 
Chattopadhay,R., and E. Duflo (2004). “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a India Wide  
      Randomized  Policy Experiment.” Econometrica, 72, 1409–1443. 
Clots Figueras, Irma (2007). “Are Female Leaders Good for Education? Evidence from India.” American  
      Economic Journal: Applied Economics. Forthcoming, January 2012. 
Clots Figueras, I., (2011). “Women in Politics. Evidence from the Indian States”. Journal of Public Economics 
      Economics, 95, 664 690. 
Cutler, David, Angus Deaton, Adriana Lleras Muney, (2006). “The Determinants of Mortality,” Journal  
      of Economic Perspectives. 20, 97 120. 
Dahlerup, D., and J. Francisco (2005). “Gender, Governance and Democracy: Women in Politics.” (1) 5  
      48 Isis International Manila and Women and Gender Institute (WAGI) Manila.  
Das, Jishnu, and Hammer, Jeffrey (2007). “Money for nothing: The dire straits of medical practice in  
      Delhi, India.” Journal of Development Economics, 83, 1 36. 
DasGupta, M. (2007). “Public Health in India: An Overview”, in Kaushik Basu, ed., The Oxford  
      Companion to Economics in India. Oxford University Press.  
Datar, A, A., Ghosh, and Neeraj Sood (2007). “Mortality Risks, Health Endowments, and Parental  
      Investments in Infancy: Evidence from Rural India.” NBER Working Paper 13649 November. 
Dehejia, R., and A. Lleras Muney (2004). “Booms, busts and babies’ health.” Quarterly Journal of  
      Economics 119, 1091 1130. 
Deininger, Klaus, Songqing Jin, Fang Xia, and Nagarajan, Hari (2011). “Can political reservations  
       improve female empowerment?”Evidence from local Panchayat elections in rural India.  
      Mimeograph, The World Bank. 
Del Bono, E, and Rabe, B. (2011). “Estimating the causal effects of breastfeeding on early child  
      outcomes.” Working paper, Institute for Social and Economic Research.  
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper Collins, New York.  
Duflo, Esther (2003). “Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old Age Pensions and Intrahousehold  
      Allocation in South Africa.” The World Bank Economic Review, 17, 1 25. 
Edlund, Laila Haider, and Rohini Pande (2005). “Unmarried Parenthood and Redistributive Politics.” 
      Journal of the European Economic Association, 3, 95 119. 
Edlund, Lena, and Rohini Pande (2002). “Why Have Women Become Left Wing? The Political Gender 
      Gap And The Decline In Marriage.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 917 961. 
Franceschet, S., M. L. Krook, and J. M. Piscopo (2009). “The Impact of Gender Quotas: A Research  
      Agenda.” MPSA Conference Paper. Chicago: Midwest Political Science Association National  
      Conference.  
Filmer, D., and L. H. Pritchett (2000). “The impact of public spending on health: does money matter?”  
      Social Science & Medicine, 49, 1309 1323. 
Filmer, D. J. S. Hammer, and L. H. Pritchett (2000). “Weak Links in the Chain: A Diagnosis of Health  
      Policy in Poor Countries.” World Bank Research Observer, 15, 199 224. 
Hoddinott, John (1995). “Does female income share influence household expenditures? Evidence from  
      Côte d'Ivoire.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 
IIPS, and ORC Macro (2000). “National Family Health Survey (NFHS 2) 1998 9: India.” Mumbai:  
      International institute For Population Sciences (IIPS). 
Iyer, L., A. Mani, P. Mishra, and P. Topalova (2011). “Political representation and crime: Evidence from  
      India.” Draft paper. Harvard Business School. 
Jones G., Steketee R. W., Black R. E., Bhutta Z. A., Morris S. S. (2003). The Bellagio Child Survival Study  
      “How Many Child Deaths Can We Prevent This Year?” Lancet, 362, 65–71. 
Kiefer, Philip, and Stuti Khemani (2003). “Democracy, Public Expenditures and the Poor.” World Bank  
      Policy Research Working Paper Series no. 3164. 
Kudamatsu, M. (2007). “Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality in Sub Saharan Africa? Evidence  
      from Micro Data.” Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming.  
Lee, D.S. (2001). “The Electoral Advantage to Incumbency and Voter’s Valuation of Politician’s  
      Experience: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Elections to the U.S. House.” NBER working    22 
 
      paper 8441. 
Levitt, S. (1996). “How do senators vote? Disentangling the role of voter preferences, party affiliation and  
      senator ideology.” The American Economic Review, 86, 425–441. 
Lundberg, S., Pollak, R., Wales, T. (1997). “Do husbands and wives pool their resources? Evidence from  
      the United Kingdom Child Benefit.” The Journal of Human Resources, 32, 1132–1151. 
Miller, G., (2008). “Women's suffrage, political responsiveness, and child survival in American history.”  
      Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123, 1287–1327.  
Miller, G., and P. Urdinola (2010). “Cyclicality, Mortality, and the Value of Time: The Case of Coffee  
      Price Fluctuations and Child Survival in Colombia,” Journal of Political Economy 118, 113 155. 
Mishra, R.C. (2000). Role of Women in Legislatures in India. A Study. Anmol Publications PVT, LTD. 
Osborne, M.J., Slivinski, A. (1996). “A model of political competition with citizen candidates.” Quarterly  
      Journal of Economics, 111, 65–96. 
Oswald, A., and N. Powdthavee (2010). “Daughters and Left Wing Voting.” The Review of Economics  
      and Statistics, 92, 213–227. 
Pettersson Lidbom, P. (2001). “Do Parties Mater for Fiscal Policy Choices? A Regression  Discontinuity  
      Approach.” Mimeo, Stockholm University. 
Rai, Shirin (2002). “Class, Caste and Gender – Women in Parliament in India.” International IDEA,  
      Women in Parliament, Stockholm. http://www.idea.int. 
Rao, Govinda, M., and N. Singh (1998a). “The Assignment of Taxes and Expenditures in India,  
      http://eac.gov.in/aboutus/mempro1.htm 
Rehavi, M. (2003). “When Women Hold the Purse Strings: the Effects of Female State Legislators on  
      US State Spending Priorities, 1978 2000.” MSc in Economics and Economic History Dissertation.  
      London School of Economics. 
Rindfuss, R. R., Palmore, J. A., and Bumpass, L. L. (1982). “Selectivity and the analysis of birth intervals  
      from survey data.” Asia Pacif. Census Forum, 8, no. 3, 5–16. 
Squires, Judith (1996). “Quotas for Women: Fair Representation?” Parliamentary Affairs. 
Svaleryd, H. (2009). “Women’s Political Representation and Public SpendingEuropean Journal of Political 
Economy, 25(2): 186 98.  
Thomas, Duncan (1990). “Intra household resource allocation: An inferential approach.” Journal of Human 
      Resources, 25, 635 664. 
Thomas, S., and S. Welch (1991). “The Impact of Gender on Activities and Priorities of State  
      Legislators.” The Western Political Quarterly. 44, 445 456.  
Warner, R. L., and B. Steel (1999). “Child Rearing as a Mechanism for Social Change: The Relationship  
      of Child Gender to Parents’ Commitment to Gender Equity.” Gender and Society, 13, 503–517. 
Washington, Ebonya (2008).  “Family Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers’  

































































































Andhra Pradesh Assam Bihar Gujarat


































































1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000 1970 1980 1990 2000
Haryana Jammu&Kashmir Karnataka Kerala
Madhya Pradesh Maharahstra Orissa Punjab
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿                                                                        

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparison: Districts with and without Close Elections
(District in an electoral year, sample 1967-2001) Close elections No close elections
Urban population (prop) mean 0.2149 0.1947
sd 0.0052 0.0039
observations 968 1124
Male literacy rate mean 0.5241 0.5454
sd 0.0054 0.0049
observations 946 1098
Female literacy rate mean 0.2878 0.2865
sd 0.0059 0.0054
observations 946 1098
SC/ST population (prop) mean 0.2618 0.2443
sd 0.0047 0.0038
observations 968 1124
SC/ST seats proportion mean 0.2564 0.2178
sd 0.0055 0.0054
observations 1223 1323
Seats total mean 10.8397 7.9426
sd 0.1382 0.1259
observations 1223 1323
Any educational institution mean 0.8212 0.7932
sd 0.0079 0.0084
observations 316 348




Proportion of Seats Won by Parties
Close Elections No close elections
Party Percent Percent
Congress 40.43 41.16




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1TABLE A6: Post-neonatal mortality
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
1 2 3 4
Fraction of seats in district won by female politician 0.0155 0.0483 0.0219 0.0104
(0.014) (0.059) (0.074) (0.074)
District FE X X
Cohort FE X X X X
Mother FE X X
Controls X
Margins 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol.
Full sample
Observations 63,876 63,876 63,876 63,876
Number of mothers 17,647 17,647
Table A7: Full set of covariates for baseline regression (column 5, Table 2)
VARIABLES neonatal mortality
Fraction of seats in district won by female politician -0.2065***
(0.078)
Fraction of seats in the district that had close elections between 0.0258
women and men (0.037)
Female literacy rate -0.1384
(0.119)
Male literacy rate 0.0263
(0.139)
Proportion of SC/STs -0.1526
See Notes to Table 2. The dependent variable neonatal moratality is replaced with post-neonatal mortality. The absence of any effects may be
because (a) postneonatal mortality is necessarily conditional upon (endogenous) survival through the neonatal period, (b) attribution of neonatal
mortality to state policy interventions that improve antenatal and early postnatal care is clearer than is the case for post-neonatal mortality, which is
more sensitive to household-level variables including nutritional investments in children and the hygiene, sanitation and pollution levels in the
household,or (c) neonatalmortality is more sensitiveto investments in mothers(as opposedto children)thanpost-neonatalmortality.
Proportion of SC/STs -0.1526
(0.120)




Birth order 2 -0.0312***
(0.003)
Birth order 3 -0.0573***
(0.006)
Birth order 4 -0.0817***
(0.008)
Birth order 5 -0.0999***
(0.011)
Birth order 6 -0.1142***
(0.014)
Birth order 7 -0.1186***
(0.016)
Birth order 8 -0.1292***
(0.020)
Birth order 9 -0.1454***
(0.023)
Birth order 10 -0.1887***
(0.029)
Birth order 11 -0.1089***
(0.040)
Birth order 12 -0.2282***
(0.079)
Birth order 13 -0.0064
(0.230)

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿                                                                                       
                                                                                               
                                                   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "!#$%&& ￿￿'￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿ )￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ *￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿










8￿￿￿￿￿+￿ ￿￿-￿ *￿￿+￿ ￿￿￿￿ 8￿￿￿￿￿￿ *￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 6￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ 0￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 8￿￿￿￿￿￿ 5￿￿￿￿￿￿














￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿








￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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